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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

left dead. Events in Hungary demonsuared rhar rh e Soviet
Union had no intention of relinquishing control over irs
satellites in Eastern Europe.
Beyo nd rhe Soviet sph ere of control, Chinese Communi st Parry chairman Mao Tse-ru ng began expressing
di ssa tisfaction wirh Khrushchev's leadership fo llowin g
Khrushchev's denun ciation of Stalin in 1956. Chin ese
discontent stemmed from low levels of Soviet aid ro
Chin a and the ovier rapprochement with rhe West,
whi ch Mao rej ected as a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.
The disp ute between miliranr China and Khrushchev's
more moderate Soviet Un ion developed in ro a schism in
rhe world Co mmuni st movemenr after 1960. Albania
aband oned rhe Soviet camp ro become an ally of China,
wh il e Rom ania distanced itself from rhe Soviet Union in
international affai rs. T he wo rld Co mmunist movemenr
was no longer Moscow's alone.
Soviet relations wirh rhe West seesawed between rel axarion and crisis. Khrushchev professed ro desire peaceful
coexistence, nor least ro al low rhe Soviet Union ro develop
irs eco nomy. His meetings wirh U.S. presidenrs and his
tour of the Un ited Stares in 1959 demonstrated a sincere
co n:mirm enr ro friendly relations. This emerging cooperano n was dealt a blow in 1960 when an American U-2
spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory. Khrushchev
demand ed a perso nal apology from EisenJ10wer and canceled a summit meeting in Paris. T he standoff over Berlin
came th e followin g year. Khrushchev insisted that the
western secro rs of the ciry be in corporated inro East Germany. When his demands were nor mer, he authorized
rh ~ e_recrio~ ~f rhe Berlin Wall. Finally, during rhe Cuban
Mtsstl e Cm ts of Ocrober 1962, relations between the
U nited Stares and the Soviet Un ion deteriorated ro rheir
worst point during rh e Co ld War. In an attempt ro impr~ve rh e ovier nego tiating position, Khrushchev tried
ro tnsrall nucl ear missil es around the island nation . A U.S.
blockade and threats of war co nvinced Kh rushchev ro
back down. Te nsion eased in 1963 with rhe esrablishmenr of a "hor lin e" between Washingto n and Moscow.
In rhe same y ar, rhe Soviet Uni on, Britain , and the
Untred Stares signed the ParriaJ Tesr Ban Treary.
By 1964 ~ru h ~hev's prestige ar home was seriously
erode?. T he mdusrnal and agri cultural refo rms that had
promtsed
. 's .111. so much yielded little. T he Sovt. er U nton
ternanonal
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suffe
red
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in
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Kh ru. Berlin and Cuba n cnses.
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Kl1 rushchev's reforms, though ambitious w .
' ere tncon
sisrenr and often unsuccessfu l. On balance h
·
' owever, he
.
was an agent of reform and progress. He so ugh
.
.
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mare excessive bureaucracy and improve rhe 11· ·
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Most sign ifi ca ntly, Khrushchev's repudiation ofSta1·tntsm
~t.
began a process of democratization thar laid the founda.
rio ns for rhe reforms of M ikhail Gorbachev.
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Nuclear Weapons
As of the early 1950s rhe Soviet nuclear arsenal grew from
a few dozen atomic bombs to an es timated rhirry cl10u·
sand to forry thousand nuclear warheads. With the
breakup of rhe USSR in 1991 , rhe very real potencial
existed rhar some of iliose weapons, or enough weapons·
grade material to create crude nuclear devices, would find
their way via rhe black marker ro terrorist organizations
or outlaw stares. Concern over rhe accidental detonation
of one or more of me remaining nuclear devices has also
been expressed because of rhe lack of proper maintenance
procedures.
Scholars have divided the Soviet nuclear weapons pro·
gram inro four phases. The early development of me pro·
gram stretched from 1940 until rile mid-1950s. The Uranium Commission was estab lished in June 1940 wicl1 a
broad research mandate iliat included exploration for uranium deposits. Research was temporarily disrupted with
the German invasion of Jun e 1941, but then continued
with a new sense of urgency after Soviet spys uncovered
rhe existence of other programs. Wirh tile U.S. derona-

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
cion of aromic fission bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Stalin gave the Soviet nuclear weapons program an even greater prioriry.
T he first Soviet nuclear chai n reaction rook place on
December 25, 1946. This was followed by the detonation
of the first Soviet atomic bomb on July 29, 1949, and
rwo further nucl ear rests in fall 1951. These rests were
followed by the detonation of a thermo nucl ear fusion
bomb on August 12, 1953. The dep loyment of nuclear
weapons by the Soviet armed forces began in lare 1953
or early 1954. These devices were initially placed either
0 11 the older Tu-4 Bull or II-28 Beagle bombers. In March
1954 custodial and transport duri es for all nuclear devices
were assigned to the Committee for Stare Securiry (KGB).
In 1955 two inrerconrinenral bombers, the Tu-95 Bear
and Mya-4 Bison, were deployed along with rhe SS-3
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
The second phase of Soviet nuclear weapons development rook place between the mid-1950s and midI960s, centering on the expansion of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal. The first submarin e-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) -rhe SS-N-4 Sark-was rest-fired from a rerrofirred Zulu class arrack submarine in 1955. By 1960 rhis
SLBM reached operational status aboard Golf and Zulu
class ballistic missile submarines. The first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) , rhe SS-6 Sapwood,
was rest-fired in 1957 and deployed in 1959. The deployment of nuclear torpedoes and sea-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) had taken place a year earli er in 1958.
The fielding of growing numbers of other nonstrategic
nuclear weapons such as artillery shells, rockers, and missiles also rook place during rhis era. By 1959 rhis resulted
in a consensus by rhe Soviet military that the use of nuclear weapons in future warfare was a certainry. Because
of this snifr in Soviet perspective, a new service was created, labeled rhe Strategic Rocker Fo rces (SRF). T he SRF
quickly became the premier Soviet armed service and the
foundation of irs military doctrine based on nuclear-war
fighting. As an outcome, the land-based missile force became the dominant arm of rhe Soviet nuclear triad.
The third phase of this program spanned the late
1960s to rhe early 1980s; ir represented rhe achievement
of nuclear pariry w ith the United Stares and an era of
arms control rall<S that limited the growth of rhe superpowers' nuclear arsenals. These arms control talks, however, provided far more benefits to rhe Soviet nuclear
weapons program than ro rhar of rhe United Stares because of radically different premises regarding the basic
inrenr behind such negotiations. The Soviets bargained
primarily from a nuclear war-fighting perspective, while
rhe United States did not. Hence, arms control supported
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the Soviet military doctrine based on nuclea r weapo ns
civi l defense, and antibal listic m i ile (ABM) program
that would prepare the U SR for nuclear war.
Increased accuracy, range, and r li abil ity characterized
the new generations of ovier I BMs a nd LBMs deployed during this period. M ul rip le-ind pendentlytargeted-reentry vehicl es (MIRVs) wer de[ loyed on
SS-18 aran and
-19 rilerro I BMs in 1974 wh ile
the first MIRVed LBM was deployed in 197 8. T he fir r
mobile ICBM, the
-25 icicl e, was in turn fielded in
1985 . Co upled with these advance in ballistic miss ile
were those in lo ng-range cruise m is ile re hn ology with
the deploy ment of rheAS-Kent 15 on rhe Bear H bomber
in 1984 and rhe -N-2 1 ampso n in th e Northern Fleer
in 1987.
The fourth ph ase of Soviet nuclea r weapons development spans the ascendance of Mikhai l Gorbachev in rhe
mid- 1980s, the implosion of rhe Soviet empire, the end
of the Co ld War, and the rise of th e Rus ian Federation .
Ir has been a dynamic period with a declaratory shift in
Russian doctrine away from nuclear-war fighting toward
deterrence and greater willingness to engage in more equitable arms co ntrol negotiations with the West.
Wh ile rh e future of the old ovier nuclear weapons
program is now un certain , small numbers of qualitatively
advanced forms of strategic weapons are being developed
and deployed. If this trend continu es and Russian sociery
successfuJJy rebuilds itself ro exploit the technologies embodied in rhe current revolution in military affairs, a future Russian program will easi ly possess the capaciry ro
outperform irs Soviet predecessor. Th is potential coupled
with recent Russian doctrinal viewpoints on future " technological war" (based on advanced military systems) in
which srraregic objectives can be achieved in an initial
deep strike provide potent reaso ns for further efforts toward rl1e control , limi tation, and perhaps total banning
of nuclear weapons.
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